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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Recognizing Self-Determination in
International Law: Kuwait's Conflict
with Iraq
I. INTRODUCTION
Different groups of people in the twentieth century have justified
their claims for nationhood based on the right of "self-determina-
tion."I However, despite these recurring claims of self-determination,
no clear international legal standards exist for this extremely subjec-
tive right. Although the right of self-determination has been applied
inconsistently to various groups of claimants, the United Nations
Charter and General Assembly resolutions, International Court of
Justice opinions, and journal publications provide general principles
with respect to self-determination.
2
This Comment analyzes whether a group that is separated ille-
I. See MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 23
(1982); see also Malvina Halberstam, Self-Determination in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Meaning,
Myth, and Politics, 21 N.Y.U. J. IrNT'L L. & POL. 465, 468 (1989) ("Almost all states support
the 'right' to self-determination by some groups but oppose such claims by others."). For
example, the Serbs in Yugoslavia, the Tartars in Crimea, and the Armenians in Azerbaijan
have been unsuccessful in invoking their rights to self-determination. Id. at 467. Britain and
Canada have refused repeatedly to yield to the rights of Ireland and Quebec, respectively. Id
at 468. In addition, the Palestinians are still without a homeland in the Middle East. Id.; see
also Marilyn J. Berliner, Comment, Palestinian Arab Self-Determination and Israeli Settle-
ments on the West Bank: An Analysis of Their Legality Under International Law, 8 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 551 (1986). Despite the setbacks of these groups, which represent only a
small number of the groups that continually attempt to obtain self-determination, most of the
colonized Third World nations were granted independence after World War II. Id. at 557.
2. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2, 55, 73, 76; see also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); The Situa-
tion with Regard to Implementation of Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1654, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/
L.366, adden. 1-3 (1961); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960); The Right of Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination, G.A. Res. 637, U.N. GAOR,
7th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/2361 (1952); Legal Consequences for States of the Con-
tinued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security
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gaily from a foreign nation claiming sovereignty over it is entitled to
invoke self-determination against that foreign nation once the group
has effectively developed into an independent state. This Comment
first defines the principle of self-determination and discusses its valid-
ity in international law. Second, it explains the characteristics a
group must possess in order to constitute a "self." Next, this Com-
ment describes the prerequisites for a valid claim of self-determina-
tion. This Comment also elucidates the various forms in which self-
determination can manifest itself, as well as the factors that decide
which particular form applies to a specific claimant group. Finally,
by applying these sub-issues of self-determination to a contemporary
example, this Comment suggests that the question presented requires
an affirmative answer.
II. SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The History and Meaning of Self-Determination
Self-determination is not easily defined, because the international
community applies the principle inconsistently.3 Essentially, self-de-
termination connotes "the right of a people to decide upon its own
form of government, without coercion or outside influence."'4 As a
legal principle, self-determination has evolved through Kantian phi-
losophy and the Enlightenment era to the League of Nations and
United Nations of the twentieth century.
1. Origin of the Definition
The notion of self-determination originated from Kantian philos-
ophy.5 Immanuel Kant, the renowned eighteenth century philoso-
pher, defined self-determination without regard to peoples and
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21) [hereinafter Namibia]; Western Sa-
hara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
3. See Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459 (1971).
Any examination of self-determination runs promptly into the difficulty that while
the concept lends itself to simple formulation in words which have a ring of universal
applicability and perhaps of revolutionary slogans, when the time comes to put it into
operation it turns out to be a complex matter hedged in by limitations and caveats.
Id.; see also Halberstam, supra note 1, at 466.
4. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 1646 (2d ed. 1977); see also
Darlene M. Johnston, The Quest of the Six Nations Confederacy for Self-Determination, 44 U.
TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 1, 2 (1986) ("At its core, self-determination involves the right of
people to control their own destiny, free from alien rule.").
5. Edward M. Morgan, The Imagery and Meaning of Self-Determination, 20 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 355, 357 (1988).
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nations.6 Instead, he wrote that every individual shares the "ability to
avoid egotistical impositions on others."' 7 Kantian self-determination
recognizes the right of an individual to be free from the egotistical
impositions of others. 8 As such, under Kantian thought, the taking of
or "assault" on the property of another is impermissible. 9
Despite this early Kantian basis, the concept of self-determina-
tion found its way into Enlightenment thought.10 It was defined with
respect to nations and peoples, and became the "philosophical basis
for the American and French Revolutions."" Later, self-determina-
tion was associated with the nationalist movements of the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.
2. World War I Transformation of the Definition
Following World War I, United States President Woodrow Wil-
son, responding to the threat of nationalism, introduced his version of
self-determination. 12 President Wilson equated self-determination
with democracy. 13 He believed not only that all people possessed the
right to determine their own form of government, but also that a dem-
ocratic government was necessary to preserve this right.14 President
Wilson's February 11, 1918, address reflected this notion: "National
aspirations must. be respected; people may now be dominated and
governed by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere
phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will
6. Id.
7. Id. (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 12-13
(John Ladd trans., 1965)). "In Kantian thought, it is the ability of persons to independently
translate their arbitrary impulses and desires into action through rational thought that defines
their juridical existence as holders of legal right." Id.
8. Id. at 358.
9. Id.
10. The Enlightenment was an intellectual movement concerned with the interrelated
concepts of God, reason, nature, and man. It claimed wide support among European intellec-
tuals in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Enlightenment attacked the established
ways of European life and played a major role in the downfall of various European monarchies
of the time. 6 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 887-94 (15th ed. 1977); see also JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980).
11. 6 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 10, at 892 (discussing Lockean
thought in the Enlightenment era); see also LOCKE, supra note 10, at 8-14; Johnston, supra
note 4, at 3 (arguing that the theories of self-determination, democracy, and nationality devel-
oped together to provide a philosophical basis for these revolutions (citing Ozi UMOZURIKE,
SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6 (1972))).
12. Berliner, supra note 1, at 552.
13. POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 3.
14. Id.
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henceforth ignore at their peril." 1 5 Moreover, one of President Wil-
son's fourteen points "urged recognition of the 'interests of popula-
tions concerned' in any future colonial settlements."' 16
However, President Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing,
cautioned that universal application of an inadequately defined princi-
ple amounted to "political dynamite."' 17 President Wilson's idealistic
nature, exemplified by his belief that the League of Nations could se-
cure world peace, blinded him to realistic and practical considerations
regarding the prospect of self-determination at the Versailles Peace
Conference.' 8 The Peace Conference transformed the Wilsonian con-
cept of self-determination into a political tool. 19 For example, the
World War I Allies employed self-determination to legitimize the
newly formed states carved out of the disintegrated German, Russian,
Ottoman, and Austrio-Hungarian empires.20
The Allied powers took over former territories of these defeated
empires and established a mandate system that implicitly embodied
the principal of self-determination. This system freed the peoples liv-
ing under the alien subjugation of these defeated empires.21 Under
the mandate system, the League of Nations assigned member states
the obligation to act as mandatory power. The mandatory power
15. Johnston, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Eisuke Suzuki, Self-Determination and World
Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779, 781
(1975-76)).
16. Robert A. Friedlander, Self-Determination:.A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1975 DET. C.L.
REV. 71, 72. President Wilson introduced the "fourteen points" as the basis for the Versailles
Peace Settlement. 12 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 10, at 692.
17. Friedlander, supra note 16, at 72; see also POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 2.
18. The Versailles Peace Conference officially ended World War I, as the victorious Al-
lied powers forced the defeated empires to sign a peace treaty and yield to other various de-
mands. POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 1-8.
19. See Friedlander, supra note 16, at 73 (describing the resulting League of Nations
mandate system as a compromise between "Wilson's idealism and the harsher realities of inter-
national power politics"); see also Berliner, supra note 1, at 553 (stating that the Versailles
Peace Conference treated the principle of self-determination as merely a political factor).
20. Emerson, supra note 3, at 463.
At the close of World War I, Woodrow Wilson and others proclaimed the right of
self-determination in universal terms, but for all practical purposes with a concentra-
tion on the European territorial settlement following the war. In substance this in-
volved particularly the destiny of the peoples in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the
Middle East who were directly affected by the defeat or collapse of the German,
Russian, Austrio-Hungarian, and Turkish land empires.
Id. See also Friedlander, supra note 16, at 73; Johnston, supra note 4, at 3; Berliner, supra note
1, at 553; POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 5. For example, the Allies restored Poland and estab-
lished several new states in Europe by employing the principle of self-determination. Berliner,
supra note 1, at 553-54 n.13; POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 5.
21. Berliner, supra note 1, at 554 n. 13; see also POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 5.
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served as trustee "for the benefit of the inhabitants," rather than as
sovereign over the territories. 22 The mandate system recognized the
rights of the peoples in these territories and provided for their "well-
being and eventual independent existence. '23 However, unlike its ap-
plication to the defeated nations' colonies, the principle of self-deter-
mination was not applied, and was not intended to apply, to the
Allied powers' colonies. 24
The post-World War I era saw the initial transformation of the
self-determination principle. It changed from a right of all peoples
into a right of "politically shapeless ethnic communities, nations or
nationalities primarily defined by language and culture" to determine
their own form of government when controlled by alien subjugation,
domination, or exploitation. 25
3. World War II Transformation of the Definition
The principle of self-determination further evolved with the close
of World War II and the subsequent establishment of the United Na-
tions. During this period, self-determination provided the justifica-
tion for decolonization.2
6
Self-determination under the United Nations Charter reflected
the notion that "the sole consideration [of sovereignty] was the exist-
ence of a political entity in the guise of a colonial territory. ' 27 Hence,
the artificial boundaries placed on former colonies became the bound-
aries of these new states, and the self-determination principle was
used as a tool to obtain international peace. 28 As delineated in chap-
ters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter, the International
Trusteeship System reflects the principle of self-determination. 29 The
Trusteeship System was established to:
promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance-
ments of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progres-
22. Berliner, supra note 1, at 554.
23. Johnston, supra note 4, at 3.
24. See Friedlander, supra note 16, at 71, 73.
25. Emerson, supra note 3, at 463; see also Debra A. Valentine, Comment, The Logic of
Secession, 89 YALE L.J. 802, 805 (1980).
26. See Berliner, supra note 1, at 557; see also Emerson, supra note 3, at 463-64; Valen-
tine, supra note 25, at 804.
27. Emerson, supra note 3, at 463; see also Malcolm Shaw, The International Status of
National Liberation Movements, 5 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 19, 20 (1983) (stating that chapters XI
and XII of the United Nations Charter reflect the principle of self-determination).
28. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1,. 1 2, 55.
29. Shaw, supra note 27, at 20.
1992]
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sive development towards self-government or independence as may
be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory
and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned.30
Thus, self-determination changed over time from a simple philo-
sophy for individuals into a principle governing relations among peo-
ples and nations. The latter definition further evolved from the
Wilsonian concept, linking self-determination to democracy, into the
post-World War II justification for nationhood among non-self-gov-
erning territories.
Today, self-determination emcompasses the right of a people to
determine its political, cultural, economic, and social institutions, free
from alien influence. 31 This modern concept raises several important
questions.32 First, is self-determination a legal right or a moral right?
Second, who may exercise the right and under what circumstances?
Finally, what forms can self-determination take?
B. The Nature of the Right of Self-Determination
Debate over the effect of self-determination in international law
centers around the issue of whether it is a legal right or a moral right.
The United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolutions, In-
ternational Court of Justice decisions, various state practices, and the
modern scholarly trend support the idea that self-determination em-
bodies a legal right.33
The United Nations Charter describes self-determination as a
principle that guides international relations. 34 This principle imposes
30. U.N. CHARTER arts. 73, % b, 76, 1 b.
31. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
32. See Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination Today: The Metamorphosis of an Ideal, 19
ISR. L. REV. 310 (1984); see also Halberstam, supra note 1, at 466; Emerson, supra note 3, at
459.
33. Nathaniel Berman, Sovereignty in Abeyance: Self-Determination and International
Law, 7 Wisc. INT'L L.J. 51, 54 (1988); see also Friedlander, supra note 16, at 74 (stating that
some commentators argue that self-determination is a fundamental legal principle of the law of
nations, based on the United Nations Charter and subsequent resolutions); Shaw, supra note
27, at 20-21; Johnston, supra note 4, at 6 ("The cumulative effect of these international instru-
ments has been to establish self-determination as a norm in international law."); Michael S.
Carter, Ethnic Minority Groups and Self-Determination: The Case of the Basques, 20 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PROaS. 55, 57-59 (1986); POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 63. But see Halberstam,
supra note 1, at 468-70; Emerson, supra note 3, at 459-63; Friedlander, supra note 16, at 74
(pointing out criticisms of the argument that self-determination is a legal right).
34. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, $ 2. Article 1 of the United Nations Charter states that one of
the purposes of the United Nations is to "develop friendly relations among nations based on
[Vol. 14:359
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obligations on member states to respect the "political aspirations of
the peoples" of non-self-governing territories.
35
Although the United Nations Charter defines self-determination
as merely a "desirable" principle, United Nations resolutions have el-
evated self-determination to an international legal right.3 6 In 1952,
the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 637, which
states in its preamble that self-determination is a "right. ' 37 In 1960,
the General Assembly passed Resolution 1514, which purportedly
grants the "right" of self-determination to all peoples, as long as the
national unity and territorial integrity of all other nations are main-
tained. 38 In addition, General Assembly Resolutions 2200 and 2625
respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace." Id. The United Nations Charter ex-
pands on this principle in article 55:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are neces-
sary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the princi-
ples of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems;
and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Id. art. 55.
35. Id. art. 73.
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the admin-
istration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these terri-
tories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the
utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the pres-
ent Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:
(a) to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their
political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and
their protection against abuses;
(b) to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations
of the peoples, and to assist them in their progressive development of their free polit-
ical institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples and their varying stages of advancement ....
Id The Charter expands on this notion in article 76:
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system ... shall be ... to promote the polit-
ical, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust
territories, and their progressive development towards self-government or indepen-
dence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement ....
Id. art. 76; see also Carter, supra note 33, at 58.
36. POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 63-72.
37. G.A. Res. 637, supra note 2, pmbl.; see also Friedlander, supra note 16, at 76; Shaw,
supra note 27, at 20-21.
38. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2; see also Friedlander, supra note 16, at 76-77 (stating
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 14:359
mandate that self-determination must be considered a legal norm.39
According to one commentator, "Whether or not [self-determination]
is actually an inherent right, there can be no doubt that it has become
a cardinal doctrine of the United Nations dating from the very begin-
ning of the world organization. '"40
Nonetheless, some commentators argue that self-determination
embodies a moral right, applied politically over the years with no
legal validity.41 Comment c to section 103(2) of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States supports
the assertion that the United Nations is not a law-making body: "In-
ternational organizations generally have no authority to make law,
and their determinations of law ordinarily have no special weight, but
their declaratory pronouncements provide some evidence of what the
states voting for it regard the law to be."'42 Yet, even these commen-
tators agree that statements by the United Nations General Assembly
are relevant in determining whether self-determination is a legal right,
especially if the statements are adopted by consensus. 43 This position
that Resolution 1514, together with Resolution 1510, effectively implies an "international
guarantee of popular sovereignty"); Valentine, supra note 25, at 805-06 (stating that Resolu-
tion 1514 reflects widespread acknowledgement that the principle of self-determination is a
right); Shaw, supra note 27, at 21; Johnston, supra note 4, at 3-4.
39. G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2. "All peoples have the
right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." G.A. Res. 2200, supra
note 2, art. 1, 1. Resolution 2625 essentially repeats and expands upon the principle of self-
determination. It states that "every state has a duty to respect this right in accordance with
the provisions of the Charter." G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2. See also Friedlander, supra note
16, at 78-79; Shaw, supra note 27, at 21; Johnston, supra note 4, at 5; POMERANCE, supra note
1, at 63-72.
40. Friedlander, supra note 16, at 75.
41. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 1, at 468; Friedlander, supra note 16, at 74 (stating
that the purported right has been criticized for being largely political, somewhat moral, and
without legal validity); Emerson, supra note 3, at 461 (" 'On the contrary, the practice of
decolonization is a perfect illustration of a usage dictated by political expediency or necessity
or sheer convenience. And moreover, it is neither constant nor uniform.'" (quoting Leo
Gross, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in NEW STATES IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD (Martin Kilson ed. 1975))).
42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 103(2) cmt. c (1987); see also Halberstam, supra note 1, at 469 n.18; POMERANCE,
supra note 1, at 64.
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 103(2) cmt. c (1987); Halberstam, supra note 1, at 64 ("Resolutions of universal
international organizations, if not controversial and if adopted by consensus or virtual unanim-
ity, are given substantial weight."); Emerson, supra note 3, at 460 (" 'What is required is an
examination of whether resolutions with similar content, repeated through time, voted for by
overwhelming majorities, giving rise to a general opiniojuris, have created the norm in ques-
366
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is referred to as the "Higgins-Restatement position.""
Application of the Higgins-Restatement position supports the
notion that self-determination has been generally accepted and thus
has evolved into a legal right.45 Although General Assembly Resolu-
tion 637 passed by only a two to one margin,4 General Assembly
Resolutions 1514 and 1654, which essentially repeat and expand the
principle of self-determination established in the United Nations
Charter,47 passed by overwhelming majorities. 48 In addition, General
Assembly Resolution 2200 passed unanimously with 104 votes.
49
International Court of Justice decisions also indicate that self-
determination is a legal right. For example, in 1971, the International
Court of Justice, in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 ("Namibia"), held that Namibia had a right to self-
determination. 50 Further, in 1975, the International Court of Justice
tion.' " (quoting Rosalyn Higgins, The United Nations and Lawmaking: The Political Organs,
64 AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1970))).
44. The Higgins-Restatement position is derived from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 103(2) cmt. c (1987), and Higgins,
supra note 43.
45. See Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 75 (June 21) (separate opinion of Vice-President Am-
moun); see also Emerson, supra note 3, at 460 (restating Higgins' conclusion that self-determi-
nation is a legal right, based on the application of her own test).
46. 4 U.N. RESOLUTIONS SERIES I 56-58 (Dusan J. Djonovich ed., 1973).
47. All of these resolutions repeat and expand upon the earlier formulations of self-deter-
mination. Resolution 637 recalls United Nations Charter articles 1 and 55. G.A. Res. 637,
supra note 2. Resolution 1514 recalls ideas similar to those expounded in the United Nations
Charter and in Resolution 637. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2. Resolution 1654 recalls ideas
founded in the United Nations Charter and Resolutions 637 and 1514. G.A. Res. 1654, supra
note 2. See also U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2, 55; 4 U.N. RESOLUTIONS SERIES I, supra note 45,
at 113 (discussing Resolution 637); 8 U.N. RESOLUTIONS SERIES I, supra note 45, at 188, 292
(discussing Resolutions 1514 and 1654, respectively); Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 73-75 (separate
opinion of Vice-President Ammoun).
48. Resolution 1514 passed by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9 abstentions, on December 14,
1960. Johnston, supra note 4, at 3. Resolution 1654 passed by a vote of 97 to 0, with 4
abstentions. 8 U.N. RESOLUTIONS SERIES I, supra note 46, at 90.
49. 11 U.N. RESOLUTIONS SERIES I, supra note 46, at 49; see also Namibia, 1971 I.C.J at
74 (separate opinion of Vice-President Ammoun). International Court of Justice Vice-Presi-
dent Ammoun wrote:
[T]he case of the right of peoples to self-determination (has] become so widespread as
to be not merely "general" but universal, since it has been enshrined in the Charter of
the United Nations and confirmed by... pacts, declarations and resolutions, which,
taken as a whole, epitomize the unanimity of States in favour of the imperative right
of peoples to self-determination. There is not one State, it should be emphasized,
which has not, at least once, appended its signature to one or another of these texts,
or which has not supported it by its vote.
Id. at 75 (separate opinion of Vice-President Ammoun).
50. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 56-58; see also Friedlander, supra note 16, at 78 (stating that
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held, in Western Sahara, that the indigenous population of the West-
ern Sahara also had a right to self-determination. 5' Thus, ample au-
thority, including the plain meaning of United Nations resolutions,
overwhelming international support for these resolutions, and Inter-
national Court of Justice opinions, supports self-determination as a
legal right.
Even if self-determination is not a universal legal right, one can-
not deny the implications of its successful application to many Third
World countries. 52 International Court of Justice Vice-President Am-
moun acknowledged the importance of prior application:
The confirmed rightness of this practice [of self-determination] is
moreover evinced by the great number of States-no less than 55-
which, since the consecration by the Charter of the right of self-
determination, have benefited from it, after having ensured, by the
struggles and strivings of their peoples, its definitive embodiment in
both the theory and the practice of the new law.
53
C. Defining the "Self"
After defining the right of self-determination and establishing its
legal nature, it is necessary to identify who may exercise the right. No
generally accepted universal norms exist for determining whether a
group constitutes a "people" for the purposes of the "self" in self-
determination. Although United Nations proclamations discuss the
principle of self-determination, the General Assembly has failed to
define the concept of "self."'5 4 In addition, even though the Interna-
the court found (1) South Africa's presence in Namibia illegal; (2) the injured entity a "peo-
ple"; and (3) the people entitled to self-determination).
51. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16).
52. POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 63 ("Certain resolutions were adopted by consensus or
near unanimity, others in the face of numerous negative votes and abstentions, especially by
the West. In the view of the Third World all of these resolutions... create binding obligations
for States.").
53. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 75 (separate opinion of Vice-President Ammoun).
54. The United Nations Charter merely declares self-determination as a principle in in-
ternational law. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2, 55. Further, United Nations resolutions state
only that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment." G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 2, art. I, I; G.A.- Res.
2625, supra note 2; see also Johnston, supra note 4, at 24 (stating that the United Nations left
"peoples" undefined); Rachel San Kronowitz et al., Comment, Toward Consent and Coopera-
tion: Reconsidering the Political Status of Indian Nations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 507,
597 (1987) (stating that "[n]o definitive formulation of the term 'people' exists in international
law"); Pomerance, supra note 32, at 311 (noting that the doctrine of self-determination is ab-
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tional Court of Justice, in Western Sahara 55 and Namibia,56 held that
indigenous people have a legal right of self-determination, the opin-
ions fail to define "people."' "T Nevertheless, United Nations procla-
mations and International Court of Justice opinions allow an
inference supporting the majority of commentators' notions regarding
the definition of "people."
Some commentators claim that the concept of "self" is incapable
of definition due to its inconsistent application.58 Others contend that
"self" applies only to colonial peoples because of its context in United
Nations resolutions and its post-World War II application to primar-
ily colonial peoples.59 Most commentators, however, propose varying
criteria to determine whether a group desiring self-determination
qualifies as a "people." For example, some commentators focus on
the factors enunciated by the International Commission of Jurists.60
The International Commission of Jurists lists seven factors for deter-
mining a "people." None is absolutely essential, and the "absence of
any one of them should not prejudice the accessibility of the right of
self-determination. ' ' 6t These factors are: "(1) common history,
(2) racial or ethnic ties, (3) cultural or linguistic ties, (4) religious or
ideological ties, (5) common territory or geographical location,
(6) common economic base, and (7) sufficient number of people."'62
surd because "'the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people.' " (quot-
ing SIR IVOR JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 55-56 (1956))).
55. 1975 I.C.J. 12, 68 (Oct. 16).
56. 1975 I.C.J. 16, 70 (June 21) (separate opinion of Vice-President Ammoun) (stating
that the majority, in referring to the appropriate United Nations resolutions, implicitly recog-
nized the right of self-determination for the Namibian people).
57. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 68; Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 70; see also Friedlander,
supra note 16, at 78.
58. See, e.g., Pomerance, supra note 32, at 312 (noting United States Secretary of State
Robert Lansing's concern when President Wilson first enunciated the self-determination doc-
trine, and claiming that the concept of self-determination is "space-bound, group-bound, and
time-bound"); Kronowitz et al., supra note 54, at 597.
59. See G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2625,
supra note 2; Emerson, supra note 3, at 463 (stating that "inhabitants, however haphazardly
assembled by the colonial Power, take over pre-existing political units as independent states"
with the limitations of territorial integrity and national unity imposed by Resolution 1514);
POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 18 (stating that the United Nations has opted for territorial,
rather than objective, criteria); see also Johnston, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing the United
Nations' practices after World War II).
60. The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organization with
consultative status in the United Nations. Johnston, supra note 4, at 26.
61. Id. (citing INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, East Pakistan Study, in 8
INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. 23, 47 (1972)).
62. Id; see also Kronowitz et al., supra note 54, at 598.
1992] 369
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. [Vol. 14:359
Like the International Commission of Jurists' proposal, many
commentators argue that economic and political ties within a group
of people are as important as ethnic, social, religious, cultural, geo-
graphical, and linguistic ties.63 General Assembly Resolutions 1514,
2200, and 2625 also suggest that economic and political unity among
a people are significant.64 In addition, the International Court of Jus-
tice majority in Western Sahara implied that the social, political, and
economic characteristics of early nomadic tribes of the Western Sa-
hara provided significant support for its holding that the indigenous
population is entitled to self-determination. 65 Furthermore, some
commentators propose tests containing factors similar to those set
forth by the International Commission of Jurists. 66
Other commentators subscribe to a narrower "colonial" notion
of self-determination, like that implied in the United Nations resolu-
tions. This colonial notion defines a "people" as a group of individu-
als with distinct racial, religious, cultural, ethnic, or geographical
ties.67 United Nations resolutions proclaim that "by virtue of [self-
63. For purposes of this Comment, the expanded definition of "people" refers to a test
similar to the International Commission of Jurists' proposal, and includes economic, political,
religious, social, ethnic, geographic, and linguistic ties within a group. In contrast, a narrower
"colonial" definition includes social, cultural, religious, linguistic, geographic, and ethnic ties,
but excludes economic and political ties within a group.
64. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2 ("All peoples have the right to self-determination; by
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development." (emphasis added)). This same passage is found in Resolu-
tions 2200 and 2625. See G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2.
65. See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 43.
66. See, e.g., Friedlander, supra note 16, at 83.
[C]onstitutional boundaries, geographic boundaries, historical relation, economic vi-
ability and sociological and psychological factors. Have the people historically con-
stituted a nation? Do they share a common ethnic, religious or linguistic identity?
Are the old and new entities economically viable? Do the people live within a com-
mon geographic area? Do they share common institutions and political authority or
common awareness as a people?
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas A. Mensch, Self-Determination Under United
Nations Auspices 282-329 (1963) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Yale Law School)). Fried-
lander points out, however, that there is no precise formula for determining how many charac-
teristics are necessary for a group to constitute a "people." Id.
Oxford University Professor Tony Honor6 offers a similar test. He states that some of the
discussed criteria are necessary for a group to constitute a people with a right of self-determi-
nation. In addition, Professor Honor6's test requires that the group "consciously" possess a
degree of distinction from its rulers or neighbors, in terms of language, culture, religion,
ethnicity, history, topography, and social mores. Further, the group must have geographical
coherence, a sufficiently numerous population, economic viability, and the capacity to assume
responsibilities as a member of the international community. Tony HonorE, The Right to Re-
bel, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 34, 44-45 (1988).
67. See, e.g., Halberstam, supra note 1, at 485 (requiring a distinct racial, religious, or
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determination, all peoples may] .. . freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment. ' ' 6 Even commentators who assert that self-determination ap-
plies only to colonial people admit that ethnic, religious, social, and
cultural criteria are significant factors. 69 In addition, General Assem-
bly Resolution 1514 supports the "Belgian Thesis," which advocates
the extension of the colonial theory to "territories with well-defined
limits, inhabited by homogenous people differing from the rest of the
population in race, language, and culture, who take no part in the
national life of the dominating country or group, and who are gov-
erned by their own law." '70
Because the principle of self-determination is continually evolv-
ing, any potential definition of the "self" is in a state of flux. For
example, whereas the term "self-determination" was applicable to
ethnic nationalities after World War I, it became synonymous with
decolonization after World War II. Noted commentator Rupert
Emerson writes that "all commentators on self-determination have
pointed out that neither 'people' nor 'nation' has any generally ac-
cepted meaning which can be applied to the diverse world of political
and social reality. '71 Another commentator, Rachel San Kronowitz,
points out that "[tihe far-reaching political implications of the con-
cept of a people, then, complicate any effort to formulate a generally
accepted and universally applicable definition [of the 'self' in self-de-
termination]." ' 72 An overly broad definition of "self" could cause
ethnic group); Valentine, supra note 25, at 816-18 (stating that linguistic, cultural, religious,
and ethnic homogeneity evinces "group cohesion," as long as there is an identifiable land base
and viable territorial foundations); Berman, supra note 33, at 91 (stating that group character-
istics may include common territory, ethnicity, language, or culture); Kronowitz et al., supra
note 54, at 597 (stating that "people" is "'a group of persons living in a given country or
locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own'" (quoting The Greco-
Roman "Communities," Collection of Advisory Opinions (Greece v. Bulg.), 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser.
B) No. 17, at 21 (July 31))); Honor6, supra note 66, at 44-45 (stating that a group is noted for
"separateness from its rulers or neighbors," with respect to language, culture, religion, ethnic-
ity, history, topography, and social mores).
68. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2 (emphasis added); G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 2; G.A.
Res. 2625, supra note 2.
69. See, e.g., POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 19.
70. Johnston, supra note 4, at 24-25; see also G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2; POMERANCE,
supra note 1, at 15, 82 n.72.
71. Emerson, supra note 3, at 462; see also POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 23 ("Except for
the most obvious cases of 'decolonization,' objective criteria have not been developed or ap-
plied for preferring one claim over another or for delimiting which population belongs to
which territory.").
72. Kronowitz et al., supra note 54, at 597.
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many nations to fear the right of self-determination, while an overly
narrow definition could deny many legitimate groups the right to de-
termine their own destiny. Emerson illustrates the problem when he
writes, "It has so far proved impossible to determine what category of
peoples, if any, will next be entitled to call upon the right of self-
determination. ' T3 Thus, despite the inherent difficulties, it is essential
in our post-colonial phase to establish a test to determine what consti-
tutes a "people."
D. Under What Circumstances May the "Self" Determine?
1. Primary Factors
A "people" includes groups that are culturally, religiously, lin-
guistically, socially, or ethnically similar. In addition, a "people" in-
cludes those who are politically, economically, or geographically
united. After determining that a group is within the definition of
"people," one must decide when this "people" is entitled to claim the
right of self-determination. The concept of self-determination has
been applied inconsistently throughout the twentieth century. How-
ever, United Nations proclamations, International Court of Justice
decisions, and related essays attempt to explain when a "people" is
entitled to claim the right of self-determination. These texts purport
that the right becomes legally cognizable when the group is under the
dominion of an alien force, recognizes its separateness as a "people,"
and expresses its desire to remain separate and independent from the
alien force.
The first prerequisite to the right to self-determination is the sub-
jugation of the "people" to a foreign influence. General Assembly
Resolution 1514 declares, "The subjection of peoples to alien subjuga-
tion, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental
human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is
an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. '74
The United Nations recognizes self-determination as one of the vehi-
cles for achieving international peace and security. 75 Hence, alien
73. Emerson, supra note 3, at 465. Commentator Michla Pomerance has even suggested
that intra-Third World colonial relationships may exist. See POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 16.
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is an example of such intra-Third World colonialism. See infra
notes 164-79 and accompanying text for a brief overview of the invasion. This new type of
colonialism makes it incumbent upon the United Nations and the International Court of Jus-
tice to establish new definitions of "people" for self-determination purposes.
74. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2.
75. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2, 55 ("With a view to the creation of conditions of
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domination, which is contrary to international peace, is a prerequisite
for a "people" to claim the right of self-determination. 76
Foreign domination can manifest itself in a variety of forms, in-
cluding colonialism or imperialism. These forms give rise to a claim
of self-determination, subject to certain limitations. General Assem-
bly Resolution 1514 recognizes these forms of foreign domination, as
it calls for "bringing a speedy and unconditional end [to] colonialism
in all its forms and manifestations."' 77 Following World War II, the
United Nations granted the right of self-determination to most Third
World colonized nations. 7 In addition, the International Court of
Justice has repeatedly recognized this right. For example, in
Namibia, International Court of Justice Vice-President Ammoun
stated that the one situation giving rise to the application of the right
of self-determination is a people's legitimate struggle for liberation
from foreign domination. 79 Commentators note that colonialism has
generally yielded to the right of self-determination of indigenous
societies.80
In addition to colonialism and imperialism, United Nations reso-
lutions suggest that other forms of domination grant "people" the
right of self-determination. These resolutions call for an end to
"colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.""' In fact, General
Assembly Resolution 2625 asserts that:
[it is] the duty of States to refrain in their international relations
from military, political, economic or any other form of coercion
aimed against the political independence or territorial integrity of
any state .... Every State has the duty to refrain in its interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote .... ); see also G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2, pmbl.
76. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 3, at 463 (pointing out that domination is one of the
consistent themes that emerges from an analysis of self-determination after World War I and
World War II); POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 14; Honori, supra note 66, at 45 (stating that
tyranny, aggression, domination, and exploitation trigger the right to rebel).
77. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2.
78. See Emerson, supra note 3, at 463-64; see also Valentine, supra note 25, at 804.
79. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 74 (June 21) (separate opinion of Vice-President Ammoun)
("I refer in particular to the fight of peoples for freedom and independence, which has been
going on ever since there have been conquering and dominating peoples and subject but unsub-
jugated peoples.").
80. See, e.g., POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 14-23; see also Pomerance, supra note 32, at
320.
81. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2 (emphasis added).
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rial integrity or political independence of any State .. . .Every
State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, so-
cial and cultural systems, without interference in any form by an-
other State. 82
General Assembly Resolution 2625 explicitly states that all forms of
coercion over an entity's political, economic, social, or cultural sys-
tems, or over its territory, are impermissible. Such coercion gives rise
to a people's right of self-determination.8 3
Although coercion is an important element of a valid claim of
self-determination, a group claiming this right must also be aware84
that it is a "people."' 85 Additionally, the "people" must express a de-
sire to be self-governing:8 6 "History suggests that those who maintain
and assert their self-government, their freedom from outside domina-
tion, and their own economic, social and cultural development are
most likely to eventually gain international recognition as peoples
who have the right to self-determination, regardless of formal
rules."
8 7
There are two widely recognized methods for a "people" to ex-
press its desire to be separate from the dominating state. First, it can
82. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2.
83. See, e.g., Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 56-57. In discussing how apartheid in Namibia
placed limitations, exclusions, and restrictions on the indigenous population over its economic,
political, and social life, the International Court of Justice found that Namibia had a right of
self-determination. Id; see also Carter, supra note 33, at 61 (stating that one factor giving rise
to a claim of self-determination is the deprivation of a group's ability to govern itself); Valen-
tine, supra note 25, at 816 (pointing out that interference with free choice, political status, and
discriminatory social legislation gives a group the right to secede from the state); Pomerance,
supra note 32, at 320 (suggesting that self-determination inures to four groups: dependent
peoples; peoples subjected to alien subjugation, domination, and exploitation; peoples under
colonial or alien domination; and peoples under racist regimes and alien occupation).
84. Friedlander, supra note 16, at 83; see also Honor6, supra note 66, at 44-45 (stating
that a group must consciously possess a sense of separateness as a people); Valentine, supra
note 25, at 817 (stating that a "people" must have an "associated desire"); Carter, supra note
33, at 61 (discussing self-consciousness as a prerequisite for self-determination).
85. Under the "colonial" definition, a "people" includes a group that is socially, relig-
iously, culturally, linguistically, geographically, or ethnically similar. Under a more expansive
test, a "people" also includes a group with economic or political ties.
86. Carter, supra note 33, at 64, 87 (stating a third prerequisite of a manifested desire to
be self-governed and evidence of legal and political institutions); Valentine, supra note 25, at
817 (suggesting that an articulation of the desire to be self-governing is necessary for a claim of
secession); Berman, supra note 33, at 70, 92 (stating that there must be an expression of a
desire, by political or military means, to change political status).
87. Kronowitz et al., supra note 54, at 600 (citing INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER,
HANDBOOK FOR INDIANS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
15 (1984)).
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hold a national referendum.18 Second, and more persuasively, the
group can engage in an armed conflict justifiable as self-defense. 89
Such violence implies that the group aspires to freedom. 9° According
to International Court of Justice Vice-President Ammoun:
If there is any "general practice" which might be held, beyond dis-
pute, to constitute law within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph
1(b), of the Statute of the Court, it must surely be that which is
made up of the conscious action of the peoples themselves, engaged
in a determined struggle. This struggle continues for the purpose
of asserting, yet once more, the right of self-determination. 9
Thus, if a group (1) qualifies as a "people"; (2) is dominated by an
alien influence in any way; (3) consciously recognizes its ethos; and
(4) demonstrates its desire to be separate, the right of self-determina-
tion inures to that group.
2. Limitations
A "people's" right to invoke self-determination is limited.92
First, a "people" may exercise the right of self-determination only
once. According to former Secretary General of the United Nations,
U Thant:
So far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Mem-
ber State is concerned, the United Nations' attitude is unequivocal.
As an international organization, the United Nations has never ac-
cepted and does not accept and I do not believe it will ever accept
the principle of secession of a part of its Member State.
93
88. G.A. Res. 637, supra note 2, pt. A, 2 ("[T]he wishes of the people [are] ascertained
through plebiscites or other recognized democratic means, preferably under the auspices of the
United Nations.").
89. See, e.g., Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 69-70, 74 (separate opinion of Vice-President
Ammoun).
90. Id. ("The struggle of the Namibian people thus takes its place within the framework
of international law, not the least because the struggle of peoples in general has been one, if not
indeed the primary factor, in formation of the customary rule whereby the right of peoples to
self-determination is recognized."); see also Valentine, supra note 25, at 819-20 (stating that
violence indicates a group's will and desire to be free); Berman, supra note 33, at 92 (suggesting
that a desire to be free may be expressed politically, by vote, or militarily, by armed resistance).
91. Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. at 74 (separate opinion of Vice-President Ammoun).
92. As the next section of this Comment explains, these limitations affect the particular
form in which self-determination will manifest itself. See infra notes 127-33 and accompany-
ing text.
93. Emerson, supra note 3, at 464 (quoting former Secretary General U Thant in U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 69, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (1970)).
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Therefore, when a group becomes a separate entity, its disaffected mi-
norities are entitled to no further right of secession.
Some commentators allude to an exception to this "one time
only" limitation. This exception applies when the foreign entity
amasses a long and infamous record of human rights violations
against the claimant group.94 It is based upon General Assembly Res-
olution 2200, which suggests that a severe violation of human rights
by any member state of the United Nations against a minority group
within that state may give rise to a right of self-determination in favor
of that minority group.95
A second limitation on the exercise of the right of self-determina-
tion is geographical integrity for both the nation claiming the right
and the dominating nation losing control of that territory in the pro-
cess. 96 General Assembly Resolutions 1514 and 2625 suggest that the
right of self-determination should not be construed to permit "the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial in-
tegrity" of a dominating country. 97 The nation accused of alien domi-
nation has a right of territorial integrity and national unity. This
right apparently preempts the right of self-determination.9" The In-
ternational Court of Justice has presided over many cases in which
nations asserted that claimants' desires for self-determination chal-
lenged their territorial integrity. For example, Morocco argued this
94. Friedlander, supra note 16, at 80; see also Emerson, supra note 3, at 463-64.
95. See G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 2, art. 5, 1. Resolution 2200 states, "Nothing in the
present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to
engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms recognized herein .... " Id. Further, Resolution 2200 states that, "in those States in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall
not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language." Id. art. 27.
Since this resolution mentions an expanded legal right of self-determination and discusses in-
ternational human rights, it follows that disaffected minority groups whose members are the
object of extreme discrimination that cannot be alleviated through an appropriate remedy
should be entitled to invoke the right of self-determination.
96. Emerson, supra note 3, at 462, 463; see also Valentine, supra note 25, at 818; Berman,
supra note 33, at 52, 70; Kronowitz et al., supra note 54, at 803-04; Rosalyn Cohen, The
Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice, 109 U. PENN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (1961).
Geographic integrity connotes a definitive boundary for the "people" invoking the right of self-
determination.
97. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2, pmbl.
98. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 3, at 463; Valentine, supra note 25, at 818 (stating that
the geographic viability of the two areas is an important factor); Kronowitz et al., supra note
54, at 593; POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 43; Pomerance, supra note 32, at 320; Friedlander,
supra note 16, at 76-77; S.K.N. Blay, Self-Determination Versus Territorial Integrity in
Decolonization, 18 N.Y.U. J. IrT'L L. & POL'Y 441, 443-49 (1986).
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point, albeit unsuccessfully, in Western Sahara.99 Commentator
S.K.N. Blay states that the International Court of Justice balances the
claimant group's interests in self-determination against the interests of
the dominating nation in its territorial integrity. loo
In addition to being preempted by a dominating nation's right to
territorial integrity, a claimant group must possess a distinct geo-
graphical territory,'0 and be geographically and economically viable
as a separate entity. 0 2 However, one commentator suggests that the
lack of viability will not, in and of itself, defeat a claim for self-deter-
mination.1 03 This commentator argues that, because of the interde-
pendence of the international community, it is inconsequential that a
nation is landlocked or unable to provide for its own subsistence with-
out foreign trade. 104
To assert a successful claim for self-determination, a claimant
group must also be politically viable, both internally and externally:
"[C]laims of [a] legal right by non-state groups and their members,
'being internationally unrecognized... must be clothed in the garb of
state rights before they can be put forward internationally.' ,,105 To
qualify as a state, a group must have a permanent population, a de-
fined territory, an effective government, and a capacity to conduct for-
eign affairs. 10 6  In other words, a claimant group must have a
sufficiently large and effectively organized population located in a de-
fined area to demonstrate its ability to meet its obligations in the na-
99. 1975 I.C.J. 12, 68 (Oct. 16). In Western Sahara, the International Court of Justice
held that Morocco's ties to Western Sahara were not significant enough to deprive the Western
Saharans of the right of self-determination, but the court also noted that Morocco's ties had a
direct bearing on the application of Resolution 1514 to the case. Id.
100. Blay, supra note 98, at 449-50 (citing J. Robert Maguire, The Decolonization of Belize:
Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 849, 872 (1982)). Blay further
argues that in decolonization, self-determination overrides the principle of territorial integrity
and national unity. Id. at 450.
101. Valentine, supra note 25, at 818; see also Emerson, supra note 3, at 462 ("Peoples or
territories to which [self-determination] applies" must be "demarcated with at least reasonable
clarity."); Berman, supra note 33, at 52, 70; Honor6, supra note 66, at 44-45 (discussing geo-
graphic coherence); Friedlander, supra note '16, at 83 (stating that a claimant group must
possess a common geographical area); Cohen, supra note 96, at 1129 (stating that a defined
territory is necessary, although it has not been strictly enforced).
102. See Valentine, supra note 25, at 818; see also Honor6, supra note 66, at 44-45; Fried-
lander, supra note 16, at 83.
103. See Valentine, supra note 25, at 819.
104. See id.
105. Berman, supra note 33, at 52 (quoting WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 53 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924)).
106. Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 96, at 1129.
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tional and international communities. 0 7 Emerson points out that
these obligations may be "too onerous" on micro-states, 08 and that
the current "low point" of member state populations in the United
Nations is the Maldive Islands with 100,000 people.109
Finally, a claimant group's assertion of the right to self-determi-
nation may fail if the exercise of this right would produce any nega-
tive effect in the international community." 10 In particular, a claimant
group may be denied the right of self-determination if the interna-
tional community believes (1) it will be disruptive; (2) the group
claims an area that is a strategic point that should be tightly con-
trolled; or (3) the group claims an area that has natural resources
that are vital to the world community."'
In summary, a "people" is entitled to self-determination if (1) it
is controlled in any way by a foreign country; (2) it is conscious of
itself as a "people"; and (3) it articulates its desire for self-determina-
tion. The limitations on this right of self-determination affect the par-
ticular form in which the right manifests itself. 12 The most
important limitations on this right are that (1) the two groups must
be geographically, economically, and politically viable as separate en-
tities; (2) the claimant group must have a sufficient number of people
to conduct foreign affairs; and (3) the group must not create
problems for the international community by its independence from
the alien or dominating nation. The most credible claim for indepen-
dence results from the presence of as many of these factors as
possible.
E. The Forms of Self-Determination and the Factors Relevant in
the Selection of the Appropriate Form for a Particular
Group
1. The Various Forms of Self-Determination
Once it is established that a group constitutes a "people" and
circumstances exist giving rise to a claim for self-determination, the
107. Emerson, supra note 3, at 471; see also Honor6, supra note 66, at 44-45; Cohen, supra
note 96, at 1129.
108. A micro-state is a state with an extremely small population. See Emerson, supra note
3, at 471-72.
109. Id. at 469.
110. Honor6, supra note 66, at 45.
111. Berman, supra note 33, at 70 (citing Clyde Eagleton, The Excesses of Self-Determina-
tion, 31 FOREIGN AFF. 592, 601 (1953)).
112. See infra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
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group and the international community must decide upon the form of
the group's self-determination. The United Nations permits four
types of self-government: "(1) the establishment of a sovereign and
independent State, (2) the free association [with an independent
State] . . . , (3) [the] integration with an independent State..., [and]
(4) the emergence into any other political status freely determined by
a people." 1 3 One commentator argues that these forms work well
with colonial regimes, yet, in non-colonial disputes, other methods are
more suitable.' 14
Although independence is the most common and most under-
stood method of implementing self-determination, less obvious forms
exist. Free association allows a claimant group to exercise sovereignty
over its own internal affairs, while the state with which the claimant
group associates retains power over national concerns, such as de-
fense." 5 General Assembly Resolution 1541 defines free association:
(a) Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary
choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through
informed and democratic processes. It should be one which re-
spects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the terri-
tory and its peoples, and retains for the peoples of the territory
which is associated with an independent State the freedom to
modify the status of the territory through the expression of their
will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.
(b) The associated territory should have the right to determine its
internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance
with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes
of the people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate
or necessary under the terms of the free association agreed
upon." 16
Another form of self-determination is integration with an in-
dependent state. Integration provides assurance from the state with
which a claimant integrates that it will exercise no form of discrimina-
tion. 1" 7 Unlike free association, integration does not permit a claim-
113. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2; see also Principles Which Should Guide Members in
Determining Whether or Not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the Information Called for
Under Article 73e of the Charter: Annex, G.A. Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No.
16, at 2a, U.N. Doc. A/4651 (1960); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 32-33 (Oct. 16); Emer-
son, supra note 3, at 470-71; Carter, supra note 33, at 73; POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 24.
114. Carter, supra note 33, at 73.
115. Id. at 76.
116. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 113, princ. VII.
117. Carter, supra note 33, at 76.
1992]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ant group to modify its status at any time.118 Some argue, however,
that self-determination is a continuing right that can be modified until
a people has achieved independence. 1 9 Regardless of this tangen-
tially related issue, the United Nations defines integration as follows:
Integration with an independent State should be on the basis of
complete equality between the peoples of the erstwhile Non-Self-
Governing Territory and those of the independent country with
which it is integrated. The peoples of both territories should have
equal status and rights of citizenship and equal guarantees of fun-
damental rights and freedoms without any distinction or discrimi-
nation; both should have equal rights and opportunities for
representation and effective participation at all levels in the execu-
tive, legislative and judicial organs of government.
Integration should have come about in the following
circumstances:
(a) The integrating territory should have attained an ad-
vanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so
that its peoples would have the capacity to make a responsible
choice through informed and democratic processes;
(b) The integration should be the result of the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge
of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed
through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted
and based on universal adult suffrage .... 120
Other processes reflecting the free will of a people include local
autonomy and merger,121 which are similar to integration, associa-
tion, and independence. Although self-determination assumes many
forms, specific forms apply to particular cases.
2. The Factors Relevant in Selecting the Appropriate Form for a
Specific Claimant Group
According to United Nations documents and various interna-
tional law opinions, the expression of the free and independent will of
a people satisfies the requirements for self-determination, regardless of
form. 122 The United Nations Charter asserts that a goal of the Trus-
teeship System is to "promote the political, economic, social, and edu-
118. POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 25 (recalling General Assembly Resolution 1541).
119. Id.; see also Emerson, supra note 3, at 470.
120. G.A. Res. 1541, supra note 113, princs. VIII, IX.
121. Carter, supra note 33, at 74.
122. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 470; see also Carter, supra note 33, at 78 (stating that
political and economic readiness are considerations only for the form of self-determination);
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cational advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and
their progressive development toward self-government or indepen-
dence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each
territory and its peoples." 123 General Assembly Resolution 1514 states
that the "inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational
preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying indepen-
dence." 124 In Western Sahara, the International Court of Justice
stated that its decision should aid the United Nations General Assem-
bly in determining the best mode of implementing the right of self-
determination for the Western Saharan people. 12 Judge Dillard
wrote in his concurrence, "[I]t may be suggested that self-determina-
tion is satisfied by a free choice not by a particular consequence of
that choice or a particular method of exercising it."'126
Commentators argue that the form of self-determination is con-
tingent upon the limitations mentioned in the preceding section.
Once a group demonstrates that it is a "people," and that it has been
subjected to foreign domination, has an ethos of itself, and has ex-
pressed its desire for independence, the group can claim the right of
self-determination. The limitations-geographical integrity of the
two areas, economic viability, sufficiency in number of people, and
effects on the international community-determine the particular
form of self-determination. 
127
One commentator suggests that economic and territorial viability
provide a right to secession. 128 This implies that viability is a factor
for determining whether a claimant group has a right to become a
sovereign and independent state. If neither landlocked territory nor
economic inviability automatically defeat a secessionist claim,' 29 such
a group may still be entitled to self-determination, although not in the
form of independence.
Similarly, commentator Michael Carter lists a group of factors
that determine the appropriate form of self-determination. These
factors include (1) the interests of the groups of the existing state;
POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 24-25 ("The essence of self-determination is method, not
result.").
123. U.N. CHARTER art. 76 (emphasis added).
124. G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2.
125. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 36-37.
126. Id. at 123 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
127. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 471; see also Emerson, supra note 3, at 469-70;
Carter, supra note 33, at 77; Valentine, supra note 25, at 818-19.
128. See Valentine, supra note 25, at 818.
129. Id. at 819.
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(2) economic viability; (3) geographic position; (4) strategic consid-
erations; (5) political consequences; and (6) diversity or similarity
among the peoples. 130 He argues that political and economic readi-
ness are merely considerations relating to the form of self-govern-
ment, and thus do not deny self-determination to colonial peoples.131
Emerson argues that other forms of self-determination for micro-
states, beyond independence, are more desirable because of the limited
ability of micro-states to assume the obligations imposed upon states
by the international community.1 3 2 Commentator Malvina Halber-
stam concludes, "[Tlhe desirability of an independent state depends
on its economic, political, and military viability and on the effect its
independence would have on other states in the region."' 3
3
Thus, self-determination can manifest itself in a variety of forms.
The most desirable form for a particular group is determined with
reference to (1) the geographic, economic, and political viability of
the two groups; (2) the claimant group's population and capacity to
conduct its foreign affairs; (3) the "one time only" limitation; and
(4) the effects on the international community.
III. A CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLE: KUWAIT'S RIGHT
TO SELF-DETERMINATION
A. Overview
This section applies the complex principle of self-determination
to the Iraq-Kuwait conflict by weighing the merits of the competing
arguments. Opinions differ as to how the war between the United
States and Iraq began. The United States argued that its purpose in
the Persian Gulf was to curb aggression.1 34 Iraq countered that the
countries of the imperialist West originally divided the Arab nation
into many states to obtain a constant source of petroleum for their
economies. Accordingly, Iraq claimed that Kuwait was always an in-
tegral part of Iraq. At the heart of both arguments is the issue of
Kuwait's right to self-determination.
Although Great Britain may have illegally separated Kuwait
130. Carter, supra note 33, at 77.
131. Id. at 78.
132. Emerson, supra note 3, at 469-71.
133. Halberstam, supra note 1, at 471.
134. R.W. Apple, Jr., Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990,
at Al (nat'l ed.). Indeed, a dangerous precedent would have been set had the world passively
watched the expansionist-minded leader attack his diminutive neighbor and annex its territory.
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from Iraq, I35 Kuwait is nevertheless entitled to invoke its right of self-
determination. Kuwait's claim for independence is substantiated by
Iraq's long-time failure to exercise dominion over the Kuwaiti people
and territory, and by the evolution of a Kuwaiti culture.
B. The Gulf Conflict
1. Historical Background
The Persian Gulf region has historically been considered an area
of strategic and commercial importance. 136 During the period of Per-
sian and Ottoman dominion in the Gulf, the bay that adjoined the
135. Dennis Hevesi, Iraq's Strike on Kuwait: At Roots, TribalRivalry, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 5,
1990, at AI (nat'l ed.).
136. HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE, ROYAL SCOT. MUSEUM, EDINBURGH, THE
EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT 16-29 (1985) [hereinafter THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF
KUWAIT]. Early Asia, from its trading expeditions, was well-acquainted with the Persian
Gulf. Id. at 16. In addition, a Greek trading colony, dating between the third and first centu-
ries B.C., occupied Turkey, Syria, and Iran down to the Gulf. Id. A temple to the goddess
Artemis, a major fortification, and well-planned homes and workshops have been excavated in
the area near Kuwait. Id. Archaeologists argue that the trading community of Gerrha, lo-
cated on the mainland opposite Bahrain and inhabited by Arabs, existed simultaneously with
the Greek trading colony. Id.
Traditionally, Arabia developed as an area conducive to two ways of life. Settled commu-
nities inhabited the more fertile coastal regions, and nomadic tribes wandered the deserts with
their flocks. Id. at 15. These two types of people were never completely isolated, however,
because the nomads traveled to the cities to trade for products they could not produce, such as
clothes and metalware, while the settlers purchased the meat and dairy products the nomads
produced. Id. By the fifth century A.D., Mecca was the most significant and commercially
thriving city in the world. Id.
Religion also played a significant role in Mecca's ascent to prominence. Mohammed
founded the religion of Islam between the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. In A.D. 622 Mo-
hammed emigrated to Medina, where Islam was transformed from a religion into a politically
organized religious community. Id. Mohammed and his supporters engaged in military expe-
ditions eventually leading to the capture of Mecca in A.D. 630. Id. During the final two years
of his life, when Mohammed ruled as the head of state, many Arab tribes converted to Islam
and recognized the authority of Mohammed. Id.
From A.D. 632 to 661, many transformations occurred in the Islamic community.
Although the Arab tribes were no longer unified after Mohammed's death, Islam continued to
expand. Various tribes dominated much of the Middle East by conquering Syria, Egypt, Iraq,
and Persia. Id. at 16. The establishment of capitals in Damascus and Baghdad increased the
demand for luxury goods. Id. at 17. Silks and porcelains from China, slaves and ivory from
Africa, and spices, gems, and fabrics from India were exchanged for pearls, rugs, cotton cloth,
and metalware from the Persian Gulf area. Id.
Although the forces of trade and religion took root in the Middle East, the Arabs were
unaccustomed to the boundary demarcations by which Europeans lived. Id. at 28, 29. Middle
Eastern tribes continued to live together in moderate equilibrium until the fifteenth century,
when the influence of outside powers transformed the Arab nations and upset the balance of
power in the region. The Persians and Ottomans existed side-by-side as dominating foreign
influences over the Arabs. Id. at 17. Despite engaging in trade with Northern Gulf Arabs, the
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east of Kuwait enabled the Kuwaiti culture to thrive as a small com-
munity. 137 Modest records from the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies substantiate the existence of a long-established tradition of
tribes that migrated from the desert to the towns and coastal regions
of the Gulf, in search of a better way of life.
138
Migrating constantly between Basra and Qatar, the Bani Khalid
tribe settled in Kuwait in the late seventeenth century. 39 In 1670, the
tribe successfully contested Ottoman control by besieging the Otto-
man governor and forcing his retreat. 140 Similarly, the Bani Utub
tribe migrated to Kuwait because of a drought. 14 1 The Sabah family,
Persians eventually became involved in hostilities sparked by the European presence in territo-
ries near present-day Iran. Id.
The Ottoman Turks' influence in the region can be traced to their military conquests. Id.
They captured Syria and Egypt by A.D. 1517, and Baghdad by 1534. Id. By 1555, they
controlled Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Basra. Id at 18. As was their custom, the Ottomans
divided their area of rule into administrative units staffed with Turkish bureaucrats. Id. The
areas were actually controlled by the heads of Arab tribes, who depended on the Turks for
defense and cooperation in transporting goods. Id. Therefore, the Ottomans and the various
Arab tribes remained on relatively good terms at the beginning because their relationship was
mutually reliant. In return for Ottoman aid in military and commercial areas, various Arab
tribes recognized the authority of the Ottoman empire.
The European powers' entry into the Persian Gulf territory caused major changes in the
Gulf's political and economic affairs. The Portuguese, Dutch, and British used the Gulf as a
"stage in the extension of their trading routes with India." Id. The Portuguese wanted to
control the Gulf because it was an ideal storage place for goods in transport, a valuable trading
post, and a strategically important area, as it aided them in intercepting their commercial
rivals' ships. Id The Persians, encouraged by the British, objected to the Portuguese presence
in the area. Id. By 1651, the Portuguese were expelled from Bahrain, Hormuz, and Oman.
Id. Consequently, by the 1700s, the Portuguese were relegated to the role of a trading and
shipping power. Id. The British similarly encouraged the Persians to expel the Dutch, who
had established several bases in the Gulf by 1602. Id. at 18-19.
The English East India Company established a base in the Gulf in 1600. Id. at 19. The
company established a factory in Persia by 1617, and by 1645, it had factories in Basra, which
was under Ottoman administration. Id. With the expulsion of their European trading rivals,
the British consolidated their economic and political power over the region. The British
placed a consulate in Basra in 1764, and by 1783, Ottoman and Persian influences in the region
began to fade. Id. The Persians experienced a civil war in 1779 as a result of their king's
death. Id. Although the Utub tribe of Arabs took control of Bahrain from the Ottomans in
1783, the Ottomans were not completely defeated until the end of World War I. Id at 25.
137. Id. at 19.
138. Id. at 19, 21; see also GEORGE LENCZOWSKI, THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD AF-
FAIRS 654 (4th ed. 1980); R.V. Pillai & Mahendra Kumar, The Political and Legal Status of
Kuwait, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 108 (1962); Hevesi, supra note 135; THE MIDDLE EAST: A
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SURVEY 165 (Peter Mansfield ed., 5th ed. 1980).
139. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 19-20.
140. Id. at 20. Thereafter, they consolidated their territory. Id.
141. Id. at 21.
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leader of the Bani Utub, has ruled Kuwait since 1756.142 As trade
prospered, many more tribes followed these early tribes and settled
around Kuwait Bay.
From the middle of the eighteenth century until the end of
World War I, the tribes in Kuwait were forced to make overtures to
the Ottomans and the English. 143 Various tribes, living under the
loose dominion of the Ottoman Empire, constantly attacked Kuwait's
Bani Khalid tribe.'" Despite its initial decline, the Ottoman Empire
increased its influence with military successes against the Bani Khalid
and the Wahhibis. 45 Although Kuwait was officially a part of the
Ottoman Empire, Turkish control from 1756 until the 1890s was
nominal.'" The Ottoman Empire classified Kuwait as a district in
the province of Basra. Until 1898, descendants of the Sabah family
were conferred with an Ottoman title, and Kuwait regularly paid trib-
ute to the Ottomans. 47
Mubarek ben Sabah ruled as Sheikh of Kuwait from 1896 until
1915.148 Sheikh Mubarek's main goal was to strengthen and fortify
Kuwait against Turkish control. 49 At the same time, trade competi-
tion pressured Great Britain to establish a permanent commercial
base in the Gulf because the Germans and Russians were gaining ac-
cess to different areas in the region. 50 Thus, in 1899, Kuwait and
Great Britain signed a secret treaty ("1899 Secret Treaty") in which
Great Britain agreed to maintain and protect Kuwait's autonomy,
142. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 660; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 109;
Hevesi, supra note 135; Mohdtalatz Ghoneimy, The Legal Status of the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral
Zone, 15 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 690 (1966); THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note
136, at 21.
143. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 21.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 23.
146. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 660; see also HUSSEIN A. HASSOUNA, THE
LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES 131 n. 1 (1975) ("Kuwait was neither an
integral part of nor totally independent from the Ottoman Empire."); HUSSEIN M. AL-
BAHARNA, THE ARABIAN GULF STATES 253 (2d ed. 1975); Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at
109, 118.
147. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 660; see also HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 131 n.1;
ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 41; Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 109, 117.
148. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 660; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 110;
Ghoneimy, supra note 142, at 690; THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at
24.
149. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 660.
150. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 42; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 110-
11; THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 24-25.
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and Kuwait agreed to uphold Great Britain's monopoly in Kuwait.' 5'
In 1899, Sheikh Mubarek signaled Kuwait's autonomy from the
Turks by imposing a five percent tax on all commercial goods passing
through Kuwait, including Turkish goods.5 2 On September 9, 1901,
the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain entered into a treaty whereby
the Ottomans agreed to respect the status quo in Kuwait, and Great
Britain agreed not to establish a protectorate in Kuwait. 53 Although
it was never ratified due to the outbreak of World War I, a 1913 treaty
between Turkey and Great Britain recognized Kuwait's autonomy. 154
After World War I, the Allies restructured the Ottoman Empire
into different Arab countries. Iraq became a British mandate in 1920,
and was admitted into the League of Nations in 1932. 55 A treaty
signed in 1922 at the Conference of Uqair set forth the boundaries of
Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. 56 In addition, the Treaty of Sevres
and the Treaty of Lausanne confined the Ottomans to the area of
modem-day Turkey, and represented the Ottomans' official relin-
quishment of all rights in the Gulf area. 57 Kuwait existed effectively
as a protectorate of Great Britain for the next forty years.
During Kuwait's protectorate period, Iraqi nationalists repeat-
edly claimed sovereignty over Kuwait.158 As a result of the 1899 Se-
cret Treaty, Great Britain consistently defended Kuwait from these
attacks.159 In June 1961, Kuwait and Great Britain terminated the
1899 Secret Treaty, thus establishing Kuwait's sovereignty and inde-
151. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 661; see also ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 42-43;
Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 110; Ghoneimy, supra note 142, at 690; THE EVOLVING
CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 25; HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 91.
152. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 253; Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 110.
153. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 43-44; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at
111.
154. Although this treaty was never ratified, it marked Turkey's first official renunciation
of full sovereignty over Kuwait and its first official recognition of Great Britain's special status
in the region. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 661; see also HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 91;
ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 45; Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 111, 119 n.69 (arguing
for the validity of the agreement), 121-22 (pointing out the ambiguity of the document).
155. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 254; see also IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY 33-40
(Richard F. Nyrop ed., 1979).
156. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 662; see also ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 45;
Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 113. The Kuwait-Iraq border was again agreed upon in
1932. Id.
157. Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 113; see also ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 255.
158. HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 91, 131-32 n.6; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note
138, at 114.
159. HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 92, 94; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 121-
24; THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 26.
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pendence. 16 One month later, Iraq again claimed sovereignty over
Kuwait, prompting England to send troops to reinforce Kuwait's bor-
ders. 161 Although this attack was effectively repelled, Iraq threatened
Kuwait three more times between 1961 and 1989162 even though ten-
sions eased between the two nations following an overthrow of the
aggressive Iraqi government. 163 On August 2, 1990, Iraq again in-
vaded Kuwait, seized control of its capital city and rich oil fields, and
drove Kuwait's ruler into exile,164 claiming that Kuwait was, and al-
ways had been, a vital part of Iraq.
165
2. Iraq's Occupation of Kuwait
Initial world response to the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Ku-
wait was swift. United States President George Bush condemned the
attack as an act of "naked aggression."' 166 In addition, the United
Nations Security Council issued a unanimous call for Iraq's with-
drawal from Kuwait, despite Iraq's claim that splinter groups in Ku-
wait requested assistance from the Iraqi military. 167 Further, the
United States and the Soviet Union issued a joint statement through
their foreign ministers, condemning the invasion. 168
Unswayed by world opinion, Iraq continued its occupation of
Kuwait. As a result, the United Nations Security Council voted to
160. HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 92-93.
161. Id.; see also Questions Relating to the Middle East, 1961 U.N.Y.B. 146-49, U.N. Sales
No. 62.1.1.
162. Iraq laid claims to Kuwait in 1968, 1973, and 1974-76. LENCZOWSKI, supra note
138, at 667.
163. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 251; see also HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 106-07;
LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 667.
164. Apple, supra note 134.
165. See Mark Fineman, Iraq Remaps Kuwait as Province 19, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1990,
at A14; see also John Kifner, Iraq Proclaims Kuwait's Annexation, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1990,
at AI (nat'l ed.).
166. See Apple, supra note 134. Bush imposed economic sanctions barring all trade with
Iraq, and froze all Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets in the United States. Id. The European Commu-
nity and Japan followed the United States' lead by freezing assets and halting all trade with
Iraq. Clyde Haberman, Trade Sanctions Against Baghdad Imposed by European Community,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1990, at Al (nat'l ed.); Steve Lohr, Experts Say Embargo May Work if
Nations Maintain Commitment, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1990, at Al (nat'l ed.); Alan Riding,
West Europeans Join US. in Condemning Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at A6.
167. See Apple, supra note 134; see also Paul Lewis, UN Condemns the Invasion with
Threat to Punish Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at A6 (nat'l ed.).
168. R.W. Apple, Jr., Iraqis Mass on Saudi Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at Al
(nat'l ed.). The Arab League denounced the Iraqi government by a 14 to 0 vote with 7 absten-
tions. Id. In addition, the Soviet Union, China, and France suspended arms sales to Iraq. Id.
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block trade with Iraq. 169 Despite growing pressure, Iraq annexed Ku-
wait as its nineteenth province170 and seized Western hostages.171 The
United Nations quickly declared the Iraqi annexation "null and void"
by a unanimous vote of the Security Council.17 2
As opposition continued to mount against Saddam Hussein, Iraq
agreed to meet with the United Nations. 173 Iraq offered to withdraw
from Kuwait if the Israeli-Palestinian issue 174 were included in an
overall Middle East peace settlement. 175 The United States declared
this linkage unacceptable. 17
6
Iraq subsequently deployed troops into Kuwait and encouraged
Kuwaitis to leave.177 Rumors spread that Iraq would attempt to hold
a vote to show that the Kuwaitis wanted to be a part of Iraq. 78 Iraq
believed it could secure its success through a Kuwaiti national refer-
endum. Iraq contended that because Kuwait had been illegally sepa-
rated from Iraq after World War I, it was still part of Iraq. However,
169. Paul Lewis, Security Council Votes 13 to 0 to Block Trade with Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 7, 1990, at Al (nat'l ed.). To enforce a blockade, the United States, France, and Britain
sent ships to the Persian Gulf. The United States immediately sent its naval task force to the
Gulf. Apple, supra note 134. France and Britain followed the United States' lead less than
one week later. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush Sends US Force to Saudi Arabia as Kingdom Agrees
to Confront Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at AI (nat'l ed.). Meanwhile, Turkey agreed to
participate in the economic sanctions and shut off a major pipeline to Iraqi oil. Clyde Haber-
man, Quick Action by Turkey on Sanctions a Startler, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1990, at A8 (nat'l
ed.). Finally, the United States, along with Morocco, Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan, sent ground
troops to secure the Saudi border. R.W. Apple, Jr., Arab Troops Join Saudi Force, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 1990, at AI (nat'l ed.); Barbara Crossette, Pakistanis Agree to Join Defense of
Saudi Arabia, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1990, at A19 (nat'l ed.). Iraqi President Saddam Hussein
later threatened to strike Israel and the Saudi oil fields if the blockade was not lifted. Nick
Williams, Jr., Iraq Threatens to Avenge Blockade, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1990, at Al (nat'l ed.).
170. See Fineman, supra note 165.
171. Williams, supra note 169.
172. Paul Lewis, UN Council Declares Void Iraqi Annexation of Kuwait, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 10, 1990, at A9 (nat'l ed.).
173. Gerald F. Seib & Walter Mossberg, US Appears Likelier to Use Force in Gulf, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 1, 1990, at A3.
174. The Israeli-Palestinian issue is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a survey of
the issues involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Halberstam, supra note 1; MYTHS
AND FACTS 1976: A CONCISE RECORD OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT (1976); Berliner,
supra note 1.
175. Seib & Mossberg, supra note 173.
176. Id. French President Franqois Mitterand modified Iraq's proposal, and suggested
that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait in exchange for an international effort to end other Middle
East disputes and end sanctions against Iraq. Id. The United States agreed with part of the
French proposal, but found other parts unacceptable. Id.
177. Karen Tumulty & David Lauter, Iraqi Brutality, Exodus Altering Face of Kuwait,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1990, at Al.
178. Id.
Kuwait's Right of Self-Determination
the world community would not have viewed such a referendum as
valid because the United Nations had already declared the annexation
void. 179
C. Legal Right Binding Iraq
Based on its state practices and participation in various pacts and
resolutions, Iraq cannot rightfully deny the legality of self-determina-
tion. Iraq became an independent nation after World War I as a re-
sult of the principle of self-determination. 180  Additionally, as a
member of the United Nations, Iraq is a party to the United Nations
Charter, which recognizes the principle of self-determination. 18' Fur-
thermore, Iraq voted affirmatively on General Assembly Resolutions
637, 1514, 2200, and 2625.182 These actions demonstrate Iraq's ac-
knowledgment of self-determination as a legal right.
D. Kuwait as a "People"
Kuwait may be classified as a "people" under both the restricted
"colonial" definition of the term and the factor-specific tests that con-
sider economic and political unity. A strong case can be made that
Kuwait's status was so like that of a colonized nation that it was
granted its independence by Great Britain after 1961 pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 1514.
Foreigners were lured to Kuwait because of its strategic and
commercial importance. 8 3 Great Britain, as the preeminent power in
Kuwait, exploited the area for its strategic location and, later, its
oil.' 84 The 1899 Secret Treaty represented Great Britain's initial rec-
179. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. After a four-month military build-up in
the Persian Gulf, the United States-led coalition defeated the Iraqi army in less than one hun-
dred hours of armed conflict. Robert E. Hunter, Let Iraq offthe Hook, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1991, at A23.
180. See supra notes 52-53, 155-56 and accompanying text.
181. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 2, 55.
182. See G.A. Res. 637, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2; G.A. Res. 2200, supra
note 2; G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 2; POMERANCE, supra note 1, at 63; see also supra notes 52-
53 and accompanying text.
183. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 654 ("The Persian Gulf became the object of atten-
tion among early maritime powers."); see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 109; THE
EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 16, 18-19.
184. In exchange for protecting Kuwait from foreign powers, Great Britain established a
virtual monopoly over Kuwaiti land and economic resources. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138,
at 661; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 110, 118-19; Ahmad Hijazi, Kuwait: Devel-
opment from a Semitribal, Semicolonial Society to Democracy and Sovereignty, 13 AM. J.
COMp. L. 428 (1964); THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 25.
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ognition of protectorate status for Kuwait. Furthermore, Great Brit-
ain officially conducted Kuwaiti foreign affairs from the close of the
World War I until the 1950s. Great Britain has come to the defense
of Kuwait on numerous occasions. For example, in 1904, Great Brit-
ain's intervention in the Gulf caused Germany to abandon its plan to
capture Kuwait.18 5 This intervention also prevented the Ottomans
from forcibly re-establishing imperial authority over Kuwait.18 6 In
1913, Great Britain negotiated a treaty with the Ottomans guarantee-
ing Kuwait's autonomy from the Turks. 8 7 Moreover, Great Britain
negotiated the current Kuwaiti boundaries with the Saudis and Iraqis
in 1922 and 1932.188
Great Britain's participation in the World War I peace talks en-
sured Kuwaiti independence.18 9 However, since Kuwait was not yet
ready for independence in the 1920s, Great Britain created a protec-
torate. In recognition of its obligations under the United Nations
Charter, Great Britain prepared Kuwait for independence in the
1950s. In 1959, Great Britain turned over to the Kuwaiti government
the postal and wireless telegraph systems it had established. 9° To
further its obligation to bring a "speedy end to colonialization in all
its forms and manifestations" under General Assembly Resolution
1514, Great Britain signed an agreement with Kuwait in 1961, termi-
nating the 1899 Secret Treaty and delineating a close friendship be-
tween the two nations.1
91
Kuwait's status as Great Britain's protectorate represents a clear
post-World War II application of the right of self-determination, a
view supported by the United States and its coalition forces. 192 This
view relies on the premise that Kuwait was legally separated from
Iraq. It assumes that Kuwait was not an integral part of Iraq because
185. Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 111. In addition, during World War I, when
Ottoman troops gathered south of present-day Turkey in preparation of an attack on Kuwait,
Great Britain sent troops to bolster the Kuwaiti borders. Id. Again, in 1961, after granting
Kuwait its independence, Great Britain rescued Kuwait from Iraqi invasion. Id. at 115-16; see
also Questions Relating to the Middle East, supra note 161, at 146-49; HASSOUNA, supra note
146, at 93-94; ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 250-51.
186. Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 111.
187. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
188. Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 113.
189. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
190. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 44.
191. Id. at 40. Kuwait and Great Britain promised to consult with each other on matters
of mutual importance, and Great Britain promised to assist Kuwait upon request. Id.; see also
Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 115.
192. See Apple, supra note 134; Lewis, supra note 169.
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United Nations Resolution 1514 forbids the use of self-determination
in situations that would disrupt the territorial integrity or national
unity of any other state. 193 Since Great Britain apparently granted
Kuwait its independence pursuant to this resolution, the world com-
munity's view is that Kuwait was not an integral part of Iraq. For the
purposes of this Comment, this "colonial" definition of people is in-
sufficient, because this Comment maintains that Kuwait was sepa-
rated from Iraq illegally.
Nevertheless, Kuwait constitutes a "people" under the standards
set forth by a number of commentators. 194 Since the 1700s, Kuwait
has possessed some of the characteristics necessary to classify itself as
a "people." Over time, it has become even more cohesive as a "peo-
ple." Thus, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, Kuwait
was a "people."
Before the Europeans emerged in the Gulf, the Kuwaitis were
historically, politically, and geographically unified, even though so-
cially, culturally, and religiously similar to other Arabs. Like most
Arabs in the region, Kuwaiti tribes followed the Islamic faith. 195 Sim-
ilarly, Kuwaiti tribes were culturally unified, but not distinct from the
other Arab tribes in the region. 196 Nevertheless, the Kuwaitis pos-
sessed one common socio-cultural heritage distinct from other Arab
peoples: they traveled to Kuwait as a result of a long drought, in
search of a better way of life. 197
Not only do Kuwaitis have a socio-cultural history that differs
from the rest of the Arab world, they are also geographically united
and distinct. The permanent fresh water supply and harbor are
unique to the region, and explain the migration of various tribes to
Kuwait. 98 Moreover, the geography of Kuwait created a unique
193. See G.A. Res. 1514, supra note 2.
194. A "people" includes groups that are culturally, religiously, linguistically, socially, or
ethnically similar. A "people" also includes those who are politically, economically, or geo-
graphically united. See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
195. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 15.
196. Although the Kuwaitis had a common social life conducive to nomadic and settling
ways, they were similar to the rest of the Arab world. Id.
197. Id. at 19.
It is not until the late 17th and early 18th centuries that admittedly modest records
concerning Kuwait came to light from which it is clear that the long established
tradition of tribal migration from Najd to both the towns and shores of the Arabian
Gulf in search of better opportunities persisted.
Id.
198. Id. at 11.
Until the discovery of oil reserves in the 1930s and their subsequent exploitation after
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economy. Nomads who settled in Kuwait adapted to become sailors,
boat builders, pearl fishermen, and traders. 199 Between 1761 and
1764, Dane Neibuhr, an early British traveler to the region, described
Kuwait as follows:
Koueit or Graen, as it is called by the Persians and Europeans,
is a sea-port town, three days journey from Zobejer or old Basra.
The inhabitants live by the fishery of pearls and fishes. They are
said to employ in this series of naval industry more than eight hun-
dred boats. In the favorable season of the year, this town is left
almost desolate, every body going out either to the fishing, or upon
some trading adventure. Graen is governed by a particular
Schiech, of the tribe of Othema [Utub], who is a vassal to the
Schiech of Lachsa [Ottoman], but sometimes aspires at indepen-
dence. In such cases, when the Schiech of Lachsa advances with
his army, the citizens of Graen retreat with their effects onto the
little island of Feludsje.2
°°
As Neibuhr points out, Kuwait was under the Ottoman Empire's tu-
telage. Although Kuwait had some socio-cultural, economic, and ge-
ographical unity and distinctness, it did not, by the mid-eighteenth
century, possess the ability to express its desire for independence.
Yet, as time passed, Kuwait became increasingly distinct as a
"people." In the mid-eighteenth century, Kuwait unified politically
under a monarchial government. 20 1 It was governed without direct
Turkish interference by a single dynasty since 1756, and maintained
its sovereignty in 1871 when the Kuwaiti tribes suppressed an inva-
sion by a nearby Ottoman governor. 20 2 Kuwait was not found on
Turkish Empire maps, and the Turks merely exercised a loose system
of tutelage over Kuwait from 1850 until 1910.203 The Kuwaiti rulers
accepted title from the Ottomans, but such title did not affect Kuwait
as a separate entity.2°4 Kuwait's payment of tribute was more sym-
World War II, Kuwait's most valuable natural resource was its bay, one of the only
two good harbours along the Arabian Gulf, the other being Bahrain .... As the area
around Kuwait bay had a fresh water source .... it was natural that a permanent
settled population should concentrate here.
Id.
199. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 660; see also THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KU-
WAIT, supra note 136, at 20-22.
200. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 20 (citing DANE
NIEBUHR, 2 TRAVELS IN ARABIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE EAST 127-28 (1792)).
201. Id
202. Id.
203. Id. at 252-53 n.5.
204. Id.
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bolic than significant because Kuwait continued to maintain its own
economic, political, cultural, and social affairs as an autonomous en-
tity, even while the Ottomans "controlled" Kuwait. One commenta-
tor writes:
Kuwait's progress in the 19th century indicates how effective her
rulers of the 18th century had been for despite increasing problems
with the Wahhabis of Najd and threats from Gulf pirates, she man-
aged to maintain her independence, by adroitly keeping on good
terms with opposing factions, and steadily to pursue her mercantile
interest. 20 5
Kuwait became increasingly unified, both politically and ideolog-
ically. Due to its unique topography and location, it also enjoyed a
distinctive economy. James Silk Buckingham described Kuwait in
1816, when he visited the Gulf:
[Kuwait] is a port of some importance, seated in a fine bay;
and the town is large and populous, though the sandy desert
presses close upon its walls, and no vegetation is to be seen around
it, within the range of human view. It seems always to have pre-
served its independence too, even at the time when Ormuz, Mus-
cat, Bahrein, Lahsa, and even Kateef and Bussorah, which two last
were garrisoned by Turks, were assailed by the Portuguese arms,
and they still bear the reputation of being the freest and bravest
people throughout the Gulf .... The town itself is chiefly inhab-
ited by mercantile and trading people, who engage in all branches
of commerce carried on throughout the Gulf. The port sends out,
at least, a hundred sail of vessels... ; and the people who navigate
them, as well as those for whom they sail, have the highest charac-
ter for probity, skill, firmness, and courage. 2°6
Buckingham's account highlights Kuwait's political unity against for-
eign invasion. He describes Kuwait's unique geography and econ-
omy, which, unlike many of its Arab neighbors, had few agricultural
products. Trading and fishing around the bay were abundant well
into the 1800s. Furthermore, Buckingham's portrayal of the
Kuwaitis as brave and skillful in boating suggests that other groups in
the region respected them. More importantly, however, it suggests
205. Id. at 22.
206. Id. (citing JAMES SILK BUCKINGHAM, 2 TRAVELS IN ASSYRIA, MEDIA AND PERSIA,
INCLUDING A JOURNEY FROM BAGHDAD BY MOUNT ZAGROS TO HAMADAN, THE ANCIENT
ECBATANA, RESEARCHES IN ISAPAHAN AND THE RUINS OF PERSEPOLIS AND JOURNEY
FROM THENCE BY SHIRAZ AND SHAPOOR TO THE SEA-SHORE, DESCRIPTION OF BUSSORAH,
BUSHIRE, BAHRAIN, ORMUZ AND MUSCOT 314-17 (1816)).
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that other groups were beginning to recognize Kuwait's separateness
as a "people."
By the late 1800s, Kuwait was a distinct society, unified by geog-
raphy, political ideology, common cultural history, and economy.
Arguably, however, Kuwait was not extremely different from other
Arabs linguistically, socially, religiously, ethnically, or racially. Yet,
the differences among the Western Europeans, Americans, and
Canadians are also slight with respect to these traits. Not every char-
acteristic of a "people" is necessary for a group to be considered a
"self" for self-determination purposes. 20 7 Moreover, Kuwait's eco-
nomic, political, and social transformation in the twentieth century
made Kuwait even more unique as a nation in the Gulf region. Thus,
even if Kuwait was not a "people" by the early 1900s, it had definitely
emerged into a "people" by 1990.208
E. Specific Circumstances Enabling Kuwait to Claim
the Right of Self-Determination
There were two periods in Kuwait's history when circumstances
encouraged it to seek self-determination. The first period occurred
before World War I; the second after August 2, 1990. Before World
War I, Kuwait was under the Ottoman Empire's subjugation. The
Ottomans controlled the entire Arab world through their vast mili-
tary conquests. 20 9 The Ottomans reasserted authority over their hold-
ings militarily at several different times during their 400 years of
domination. 210 They were an overwhelming imperial power, even
though they ruled their territories loosely. In addition, the Ottomans
demanded that all Arab tribes pay tribute to them.211 Since military
aggression against a "people" is a form of subjugation, and since
forced payments are also a form of domination, the first requirement
of self-determination was met.
In addition to foreign domination, Kuwait was also conscious of
itself as a "people" distinct from its subjugators. Sheikh Mubarek's
overtures to Great Britain in 1897 and 1898 to prevent Turkey from
annexing Kuwait 2l2 represent his desire to secede from the Ottomans.
Sheikh Mubarek's five percent duty on all goods transported through
207. See, e.g., supra note 61 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 54-73, 194 and accompanying text.
209. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 17.
210. Id. at 17-18, 23.
211. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
212. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 41; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 110;
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Kuwait, including Ottoman goods, 213 suggests that Kuwait consid-
ered itself autonomous. Finally, during World War I, a Kuwaiti ves-
sel jettisoned the Ottoman flag and flew Kuwait's flag in its place.
214
Symbolically, this suggests a Kuwaiti ethos and awareness of itself as
a separate "people."
As well as possessing an ethos and being subject to alien domina-
tion, Kuwait expressed its desire for independence by seeking Great
Britain's assistance in 1897 and 1898.215 Buckingham's account sug-
gests that Kuwait also preserved its independence by resorting to
force.216 Kuwait's execution of the 1899 Secret Treaty with Great
Britain, guaranteeing Great Britain an economic monopoly in Kuwait
in exchange for protection, 21 7 conveys that Kuwait desired indepen-
dence, but lacked the power to preserve it. Additionally, the British
and Ottoman agreements of 1901 and 1913 suggest that Kuwait,
through its agent, Great Britain, was interested in preserving its au-
tonomy. 218 Kuwait's pledge of allegiance to Great Britain at the out-
break of World War I was made in exchange for Great Britain's
promise to preserve the Kuwaiti independence. 219
Similarly, Kuwait met the requirements for self-determination on
August 2, 1990. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait constituted alien subjuga-
tion. Even before the military attack, Iraq's attempts to place produc-
tion quotas on members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries ("OPEC") was a form of coercion. 220 Kuwait's defiance of
OPEC quotas connotes an assertion of its ethos and desire for inde-
pendence. And perhaps most importantly, Kuwait's resistance of the
Iraqi invasion 221 illustrates a sincere effort by a "people" to express its
THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 24-25; LENCZOWSKI, supra note
138, at 661.
213. ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 253; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 110.
214. Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 112.
215. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
216. See THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 22-23. Niebuhr's
account of Kuwait also discussed Kuwait's ability to preserve its independence. See id. at 20.
217. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
218. The 1901 agreement provided that Turkey promised to respect the status quo in Ku-
wait if Great Britain did not annex or establish a protectorate over Kuwait. ALBAHARNA,
supra note 146, at 43. The 1913 agreement provided that Turkey would recognize the auton-
omy of Kuwait if Great Britain would again agree not to establish a protectorate over Kuwait.
Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 120-22.
219. Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 112.
220. See Apple, supra note 134.
221. See Kim Murphy, Reprisals Curtail Kuwait Resistance, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 1990, at
A6.
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desire to be free from alien domination.222 Thus, Kuwait's resistance
to Iraqi annexation demonstrates that Kuwait maintained its right of
self-determination.
F. Kuwait's Right to be an Independent and Sovereign State
Although Kuwait did not meet the prerequisites for transforming
its right of self-determination into nationhood 223 after World War I,
today it has territorial integrity, a large population, a strong economy,
and a capacity to conduct foreign affairs. In addition, Kuwait's au-
tonomy presents minimal problems for the region, and it does not
interfere with Iraq's territorial integrity or political unity.
After World War I, Great Britain effectively established a protec-
torate over Kuwait, with the intent to prepare Kuwait for future inde-
pendence. Kuwait was an impoverished Third World country after
World War I, as oil was not discovered until the 1930s.224 Its popula-
tion numbered only 50,000,225 making it virtually impossible for Ku-
wait to take on the responsibilities of nationhood. Moreover,
Kuwait's continual acquiescence to Great Britain's foreign affairs pol-
icy, as well as Kuwait's relinquishment of its right to conduct foreign
affairs in the 1899 Secret Treaty, suggests a lack of political indepen-
dence. In addition, Kuwait's boundaries after World War I were
unestablished. 226  The Versailles Peace Conference created many
Arab states, but not Kuwait. 227 In fact, its boundaries were not offi-
cially set until 1932. Iraq's assertions between 1920 and 1940 that
Kuwait was part of Iraq supports Iraq's claim of national unity dis-
ruption. The world community may also have been concerned that if
Kuwait was granted nationhood, a major strategic port would have
been under the control of an impoverished and powerless nation.
The progression of Kuwaiti society during the twentieth century
created conditions that transformed Kuwait's desire for self-determi-
nation into a quest for nationhood. Assuming Kuwait's exercise of
222. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
223. The requirements of nationhood are the same as the requirements for presenting a
credible claim for independence. These requirements include geographical integrity, economic
viability, a sufficient population, and political viability. See Halberstam, supra note 1, at 471;
Emerson, supra note 3, at 469-70; Carter, supra note 33, at 77; Valentine, supra note 25, at 818-
19.
224. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 662, 665; see also HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 92;
THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 83.
225. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 38.
226. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
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self-determination violated the notion that self-determination may be
exercised only once, 228 Iraq argued that Kuwait made a secessionist
claim. This Comment accepts this premise because Iraq claimed that
Kuwait had always been a vital part of Iraq.229 Therefore, the argu-
ment continues, the establishment of Iraq granted it the right of self-
determination. Any claim of self-determination by a part of Iraq,
such as Kuwait, violates this central United Nations Charter
principle.
230
Even assuming the validity of this argument, Iraq's countless
human rights violations against its own people23I allow the minority
group to assert the right of self-determination. Some of the atrocities
described to the United States Congress following the Iraqi invasion
include execution, rape, torture, and looting.232 These atrocities are
not new. During its eight-year war with Iran, Iraq used poison gas on
its own Kurdish population.233 With such a long record of continued
and serious human rights violations committed against various groups
under Iraqi control, 234 Kuwait's right of self-determination may be
exercised under General Assembly Resolution 2200.235
Kuwait represents a major exception to the "one time exercise"
rule. It also possesses a distinct and definitive geographical area, as
well as a sufficiently large population. If the current low point for
United Nations member populations is approximately 100,000 people,
Kuwait's population, which was 250,000 in 1958236 and over
228. See Friedlander, supra note 16, at 80; Emerson, supra note 3, at 463-64.
229. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
231. Sue Ellen Christian, Witnesses Tell ofIraq Atrocities in Kuwait, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1990, at A6.
232. Id.
We took our cousin, who was in labor, to Sabah Maternity Hospital. Upon our
arrival, we saw a Kuwaiti woman at the front door-in hysterics, because she was in
labor and they [Iraqi troops] would not allow her to enter. When she continued to
scream, they put a bayonet through her stomach, pinning her to the wall. We left the
hospital immediately and delivered my cousin's baby at home.
Id. (quoting American witness Deborah Hadi).
233. See Roger Simon, Did Non-Meeting of Minds Result in War?, L.A. TIMES, July 21,
1991, at E2.
234. This Comment assumes that Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq. The human rights
violations against the Kurds and Kuwaitis are assumed, therefore, to be committed against
minority groups within Iraq.
235. G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 2; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
236. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 38; see also LENCZOWSKI,
supra note 138, at 663.
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1,000,000 in 1978,237 meets the United Nations' requirement for affili-
ation. Kuwait's borders were set in practice by the 1913 Ottoman-
British Treaty, and have been official since 1932.238 The 1932 Iraq-
Kuwait agreement, negotiated by Great Britain, reiterated the 1913
boundary demarcations. 239 In addition, the Saudi Arabian-Kuwaiti
border was established, along with a neutral zone, at the Convention
of Uqair in 1922.2
40
Kuwait is also a viable nation. Geographically, it suffers no ac-
cess problems, as it is not landlocked. 241 Its economy has thrived
since the discovery of oil.242 Kuwait has a model welfare system, sur-
passing even that of Sweden. 243 Education, healthcare, and telephone
service in Kuwait are free, 244 and study-abroad programs are subsi-
dized by the government. 245 Kuwait imposes no taxes, except for im-
port, duties.246  Employment is guaranteed, as the government
promises to hire citizens if they cannot obtain private sector employ-
ment. 247 A person cannot lose a government job unless the Crown
Prince approves the termination. 24  Finally, not only does Kuwait
have a model welfare system, its economy is one of the most advanced
in the world, and its per capita gross national product is one of the
world's highest.
249
Beyond its socio-economic and geographic viability as a state,
Kuwait is politically viable, both internally and externally. It has
demonstrated a capacity to conduct its own foreign affairs since the
1950s. 250 In addition, Kuwait is a member of a number of interna-
237. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 473 (1974); see also LENCZOW-
SKI, supra note 138, at 663.
238. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
241. Kuwait is a tiny nation located southeast of Iraq, north of Saudi Arabia, and west of
the Persian Gulf.
242. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 662.
243. See RICHARD F. NYROP ET AL., AREA HANDBOOK FOR THE PERSIAN GULF STATES
59-60 (1977); see also THE ARAB WORLD 102 (Irwin Isenberg ed., 1976) (reprinting The Oil
States of the Persian Gulf, GREAT DECISIONS 71 (1975)); THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF Ku-
WAIT, supra note 136, at 86; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 237, at 475.
244. THE ARAB WORLD, supra note 243, at 102.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. THE WORLD BANK, WORLD TABLES 1991, at 1-5, 356.
250. See Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 114.
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tional organizations,251 and has created the Fund for Arab Economic
Development.
25 2
Kuwait established itself as a constitutional monarchy in 1962.253
Its constitution provides that Kuwait is an Arab state with an heredi-
tary ruler, or Emir, ruling under Islamic law. 254 The Emir has the
power to make legislative decisions in consultation with the Crown
Prince and his Council of Ministers. 255 The Crown Prince is the next
in line to the throne, and he chooses the Cabinet of the Emir.25 6 A
national legislative body is popularly elected for four-year terms.257
Laws are approved by the legislature and ratified by the Emir.25 8 The
official state religion is Islam,259 and personal liberty, freedom of
press, and freedom of speech are basic tenets of the constitution. 260
Kuwait's constitution also establishes a tripartite division of power
between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of govern-
ment, similar to that of the United States.
261
In the 1970s, Kuwaiti oil reserves were estimated to be the fourth
largest in the world.262 Yet, because Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the
former Soviet Union, Venezuela, Mexico, the United States, and
United Arab Emirates all produce oil, Kuwait's oil producing capabil-
ities pose no threat to the international community. However, if Iraq
were to conquer Kuwait, Iraq would effectively control one-fourth of
the world's oil supply. This would pose a serious threat to interna-
251. HASSOUNA, supra note 146, at 92. The list includes membership in the Arab League
since 1961. Id. at 102. Moreover, Kuwait became a member of the United Nations in 1963.
Id. at 110. Other organizations in which Kuwait is a member include the International Tele-
communications Union, the Universal Postal Union, the International Maritime Consulative
Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organizations, and the International Labour Office. Id. at 132 n.8; see also AL-
BAHARNA, supra note 146, at 251, 256 n.2; Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 129; Hijazi,
supra note 184, at 434-35; THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 87.
252. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 87; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, supra note 237, at 476; Questions Relating to the Middle East, supra note 161, at 147.
253. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 663-64; see also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note
237, at 473; Hijazi, supra note 184, at 436-37; THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra
note 136, at 83-84; see generally Saba Habachy, A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law:
Constitutional Government in Kuwait, 3 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 116 (1964).
254. Habachy, supra note 253, at 116.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. LENCZOWSKI, supra note 138, at 665.
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tional stability. The presence of multinational forces in Saudi Arabia
resulted from this potential threat.
Iraq's economic viability, geographic cohesiveness, and political
unity are not threatened by the existence of Kuwait as a separate
state. Currently, Iraq controls approximately six percent of the
world's oil reserves, 263 and has access to the Persian Gulf through
seventy-eight kilometers of coastline.264 Kuwait would not interfere
with the majority socio-political faction in Iraq. Iraq's population is
between fifty and fifty-five percent Shiite Muslim. 265 Forty percent of
its population is Sunni Muslim, half of which are non-Arab Kurds.26
6
In contrast, Kuwait is primarily a Sunni Muslim state with only a tiny
fraction of Shiites.2 67
Kuwait's existence does not threaten Iraq's territorial integrity.
First, Kuwait's landmass is minuscule compared to Iraq's. 268 Second,
Iraq's claims to Kuwait rest on the assumption that Iraq is the succes-
sor to the Ottoman Empire. 269 Commentators discredit this claim.2 70
In addition, it does not follow that Kuwait is an integral part of Iraq.
As the Ottoman successor, Iraq would be bound by the Treaties of
Sevres and Lausanne in which Turkey surrendered all rights to terri-
tories outside present-day Turkey.271 Moreover, the Ottomans' grant
of territory to Iraq did not include the Kuwaiti territory. 27
2
Iraq's previous acquiescence to Kuwait's existence casts doubt on
its current claim. Iraq was a party to the 1922 and 1932 agreements
establishing the borders of Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. There-
fore, by its signature, Iraq recognized Kuwait's right to certain lands.
In addition, the heads of state of Iraq and Kuwait have, over the
years, exchanged letters recognizing Kuwait's sovereignty.27
3
263. NYROP ET AL., supra note 243, at 274.
264. Id. at 68.
265. Id. at 4.
266. Id. at 4-5.
267. THE EVOLVING CULTURE OF KUWAIT, supra note 136, at 45.
268. Iraq occupies an area of approximately 169,235 square miles. THE EUROPA WORLD
YEARBOOK 1991, at 1405 (32d ed.). Kuwait, in contrast, occupies an area of approximately
6880 square miles. Id at 1623.
269. The argument that Iraq is the Ottoman successor follows from Iraq's contention that
no other entity could possibly claim rights to the Kuwaiti territory.
270. See ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at 252-57; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138,
at 116-30.
271. Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 126-29; see also ALBAHARNA, supra note 146, at
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Evidence of Iraq's tacit recognition of Kuwait as a separate en-
tity can also be found in other intergovernmental correspondence that
took place between Iraq and Kuwait concerning various commercial,
economic, and security matters.27 4 There was a further exchange of
letters in 1963 between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti heads of state confirm-
ing Iraq's official recognition of Kuwait's independence and the
boundaries between the two nations, as established by the 1932
treaty. 275 Kuwait and Iraq also signed a financial agreement in 1963
providing that Kuwait would lend thirty million British pounds to
Iraq. 276 By entering into these agreements, Iraq implicitly recognized
the sovereignty and integrity of Kuwait.
Finally, Iraq agreed to admit Kuwait to a number of interna-
tional organizations.2 77 In fact, Iraq even sponsored Kuwait's appli-
cations to join the International Telecommunications Union and the
International Labour Organization. 278 Moreover, the long intervals
between 1923 and 1990 when Iraq was silent on the issue of Kuwait's
sovereignty 279 could be construed as acceptance of Kuwait's status.
IV. RESOLUTION
As the Kuwaiti example demonstrates, a claimant group consti-
tuting a "people" is entitled to invoke the right of self-determination
when, against the group's will, a foreign entity claiming sovereignty
over it attempts to reassert its authority over the group after a long
hiatus during which the group has effectively developed into an in-
dependent state. This right inures to the group even if the group was
separated illegally from the dominating foreign "sovereign." This
rule is recognized when the group is a "people" that has been subju-
gated against its will after having essentially met the requirements for
nationhood. The supposed illegal separation claim by the subjugator
is defeated because the foreign sovereign has silently acquiesced in the
group's independence by not asserting control in circumstances in
which a motherland would be expected to intervene.
This proposed rule could be applied in all situations where one
"people" uses force against another. The world community should
utilize the right of self-determination in analyzing the validity of the
274. Id. at 256 n.2.
275. Id. at 252.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.; see also Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 129.
279. See Pillai & Kumar, supra note 138, at 252.
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two parties' positions. If the International Court of Justice or the
United Nations finds that the dominated "people" is entitled to self-
determination, the world should support that group's claim for self-
determination, regardless of its form. If the international tribunal dis-
covers otherwise, the world community should support the aggressor
to the extent necessary to deny the claim for self-determination.
However, the world community should not permit the killing of the
members of any group. This proposed rule would provide legal valid-
ity to what nations already do-take sides in a conflict. Employing
international law would resolve conflicts more decisively and with
fewer casualties. In addition, the rule enables the International Court
of Justice to clarify some of the confusion among various sub-issues
involved in a claim for self-determination. 280 Most importantly, it
would reaffirm the principle of self-determination as a principle of
democracy. 2
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V. CONCLUSION
This Comment analyzes the right of self-determination, using the
example of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict. Self-determination is the right
of a group of people to determine its political, economic, and cultural
institutions without foreign influence. Self-determination is a legal
right that applies to a group of people who are culturally, religiously,
280. For example, the proposed rule would enable the international tribunal to define
more clearly the concept of "self," the factors necessary for a group to present a valid claim of
self-determination, and the factors involved in deciding the particular form.
281. The freedom of the former "Iron Curtain" nations in eastern Europe is another con-
temporary application of the principle of self-determination from the inverse point of view.
Instead of assuming an illegal separation, the eastern European examples assume illegal annex-
ations by the oppressors. These cases present claims that are at least as valid as Kuwait's. The
recent independence of the Baltic republics is similarly significant. See, e.g., Jerry Gray, Ger-
many and Britain Split on Larger Community, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at A17; Clifford
Krauss, Ukrainian Leader and Bush Confer, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 26, 1991, at A8. Furthermore,
the claims of Northern Ireland, Croatia, and the Palestinians have reached the point of armed
conflict. For a discussion of the Croatian conflict with Yugoslavia, see Jonathan Schell, By-
standers to War on Principle?, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1991, at 29 (Nassau and Suffolk ed.); Wil-
liam Drozdiak, EC Balks at Sending Force to Yugoslavia, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1991, at A19;
Carl J. Williams, Croatia Mobilizes as Serbian Sees "Total War" Move, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7,
1991, at Al; Carl J. Williams, Croatia Leader's Palace Attacked, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1991, at
Al. For an analysis of Northern Ireland, see Kevin Culler, A Land Ruled by the Status Quo;
As Political Talks Collapse, No One Is Surprised or Overly Upset: Northern Ireland, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 14, 1991, at 72. For a discussion of the Palestinian conflict, see David Mavosky,
Israel "Gave Nod" to Hussein's Visit to PNC Congress, JERUSALEM POST, Oct. 2, 1991.
Although these examples are illustrative of how this proposed rule would apply outside of
Kuwait, they are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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socially, economically, and politically unified. The right becomes le-
gally cognizable when the group is subjected to foreign domination,
recognizes its ethos as a "people," and expresses its desire for inde-
pendence. Self-determination can take a variety of forms. Indepen-
dence is the chosen form for groups that have demonstrated viability
as a separate entity. Kuwait provides a contemporary example of a
group that is entitled to invoke the right of self-determination in this
form. As this example demonstrates, self-determination should be
recognized in other situations similar to that of Kuwait.
Robert E. Frankel

